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the distaste or the contempt of those who know them (IV.11, p. 282). Thus, a
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LI MI TS TO SOCI AL AUTHORI TY
self-regarding act, although harmless to others, can trigger their aversion and
thereby result in harm to the agent himself.
Mill contends that the natural penalties  are the only ones to which a
person should ever be subjected for his self-regarding conduct (IV.6, pp. 278
9). Nevertheless, the fact that such penalties are inseparable from mere dislike
may seem to pose a problem for his earlier suggestion that harm must mean
something other than mere dislike. Self-regarding acts cannot be said to be
harmless, someone might object, because they inspire dislike and the harms
that are inseparable from it. But this is not an insurmountable objection. Self-
regarding acts can be said to be harmless to others. There are really two aspects
to consider.
On the one hand, self-regarding acts admittedly can cause self-harm
through the actions of others, but that is not harm to them. Indeed, these
natural penalties are largely self-inflicted, Mill seems to be saying, because
they are direct consequences of self-regarding conduct itself. Others do not
really want to inflict punishment on the person, apart from that which is
implied in the exercise of their own liberty. Rather, they feel compelled to avoid
his company by what they consider his self-regarding vices. He in effect brings
these harms on himself because any reasonable person can foresee the likely
consequences of his displays of obstinacy, intemperance and the like. Thus,  it
is not our part to inflict any suffering on him except what may incidentally
follow from our using the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs,
which we allow to him in his (IV.7, p. 280, emphasis added).
On the other hand, what about the suffering implied for others by the
natural penalties which flow from a self-regarding act? Don t the other people
who feel compelled to avoid a person s company suffer the loss of his friendship
and all which that may entail? Evidently so. Yet they are not directly affected
against their wishes. They do choose, however reluctantly, to avoid him, and
what they choose to do cannot be said to cause them harm:  volenti non fit
injuria (see Mill, 1861b, p. 253, quoting Ulpian).
Equal rights to complete liberty of self-regarding acts are thus compatible
with natural penalties because such harms are not harms to others. Liberty is
choosing in accord with one s own judgment and likes; natural penalties are
95
THE ARGUMENT OF ON LI BERTY
inseparable from dislike of another s self-regarding act; and so natural penalties
are inseparable from the self-regarding exercise of liberty itself. Other-regarding
actions are simply not involved.
Natural penalties versus artificial punishment (IV.7)
Mill insists on a distinction, then, between natural penalties which are not
harms to others, and artificial penalties which are harms to others. The latter
are deliberately inflicted on the individual because society decides to retaliate
against his immoral conduct, that is, conduct which the majority judges causes
serious harm to other people by damaging their rights and other essential
interests.1 This distinction between natural and artificial penalties calls to mind
Hume, whose influence on Mill s philosophy is not sufficiently appreciated in
the literature.2
This  is not a merely nominal distinction , Mill says (IV.7, p. 279). Two
distinct psychological phenomena are involved. If we become aware of another
person s self-regarding faults, for example, then we recognize that the harmful
consequences of his acts fall on himself. Thus:
[W]e may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof . . . but we shall
not therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable. We shall
reflect that he already bears, or will bear, the whole [natural] penalty of
his error; if he spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that
reason, desire to spoil it further: instead of wishing to punish him, we
shall rather endeavour to alleviate his [self-inflicted] punishment, by
showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his [self-regarding]
conduct tends to bring upon him. He may be to us an object of pity,
perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or resentment.
(IV.7, pp. 279 80)
But  it is far otherwise if we become aware of another person s moral vices
(IV.7, p. 280). For  the evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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